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CONTEXT: MAKING BELIEFS OF 
MIGRANTS UNAMBIGUOUS 
by Linda Whiteford 
What is the significance of investigating migration? The physical process 
of geographical movements of people has provided the basis of a 
framework to which various paradigms and heuristics have been applied in 
attempts to explain human behavior. Analyses of migration have been of- 
fered that are based on the economic and political resources available to dif- 
ferent sectors of populations, and other forces external to the individual. 
Analyses oriented toward forces operating within individuals-for example, 
a simulation of value systems and studies of natural decision-making (in- 
cluding concepts such as risk reduction, strategies, and plays)-have been 
attempted i11 an effort to integrate external forces with individual adapta- 
tions. Yet what do we know about what makes an individual become a mi- 
grant? That is, what distinguishes the individual who becomes a migrant 
from one who, in a similar set of circumstances, does not? If there are dif- 
ferences between those who migrate and those who do not, and it seems that 
at some level there must be, the question remains as to what those differ- 
ences are. If we assume that there are differences between those who decide 
to migrate and those who decide not to, and further, that those differences 
are more than a difference in locality, can we explain the differences solely 
in terms of constraints and resources external to the individual? It is 
reasonable to assume that constraints provided by the general socio- 
economic system and by the individual's social characteristics condition de- 
cisions whether to migrate. We must consider that an individual's percep- 
tion of his or her world would also be a significant factor in decision- 
making, and that unless we have a way of assessing those cognitive factors, 
we will have little hope of anticipating who will and will not migrate. The 
aim of the approach I am presenting is to be able to distinguish those likely 
to migrate from those not likely to, on the basis of their hierarchical order- 
ing of individually held belief sets. Such an approach may give studies of 
migration a significance more general than their particular subject by ex- 
tending their analyses and explanations to  include processes involved in all 
human behavior. 
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It is possible to create a paradigm that integrates approaches concerned 
with whole systems (such as social, political, and economic constraints) with 
an investigation of individual belief systems. While such an integrative par- 
adigm would incorporate social, economic, and political constraints and re- 
sources as elements external to individuals, much of its focus would be on 
the analysis of elements specific to individuals. These elements would be the 
hierarchical ordering and weighting of the informant's beliefs, and the re- 
construction of belief systems. An individual's belief system is seen as the 
context, in conjunction with external constraints, which comprises the base 
upon which the decision to migrate is made. In this paper, I conceptualize 
"context" at three levels. At the most concrete level, I think of context as 
the symbol strings, or groups of sentences, recorded from an informant's 
spontaneous linguistic interactions. Because verbal interaction is a primary 
source of data which provides direct evidence for representing cognitive re- 
ality, it is used as the basis for reconstructing beliefs. At the second level, I 
use the term context to represent the reconstructed overall belief system of 
an individual informant. At the most abstract level, I use context to refer to 
general similarities of belief systems of a set of people, as for instance, mi- 
grants. 
Through the enculturation process, a group of people comes to share 
some of the same values. Do people who migrate maintain those shared val- 
ues, or do they change them? To understand life-choices migrants make, it 
is important to  know whether or not they change their values and, because 
of that change, then migrate; or  migrate and then change their values to fit 
their new lives. Research on this question is difficult, because individuals do 
not visibly become migrants until after the decision to move, thereby forc- 
ing an expostfacto analysis of the individual's belief system. If we want to 
understand how people become migrants, we need to investigate the pro- 
cesses of symbol manipulation and belief change. We cannot begin to do so 
until we are able first to isolate what an individual's beliefs are. I suggest 
that a cognitive approach will provide us with a means of specifying a seg- 
ment of an individual's belief system at a given moment. We may find that 
migration is an overt demonstration that cognitive change has occurred, 
that the decision to migrate is a conclusion logically derived from a symbol 
chain. I propose that to understand why people migrate we need to under- 
stand how they manipulate the symbols that comprise their cognitive world, 
and to understand the construction and ordering of their belief systems. 
For the last five years, a group of anthropologists and linguists has been 
working with Dr. Marvin Loflin on conceptualizing the processes involved 
in symbol manipulation. In this paper I am presenting an aspect of that still 
experimental approach. For the sake of convenience, rather than explain 
the background, I will present as primitives the following two concepts. The 
first primitive is an operational definition of belief. Beliefs are statements 
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made by an individual upon which he is willing to act (Loflin, 19755). The 
second primitive is that human logical processes are universal (Loflin, 
1975:2). 
If we define beliefs as symbol strings that are acted upon, we can, then, 
infer them from daily interactions. Apparent contradictions between what a 
person states as his beliefs, and what are observed as his actions, can be ex- 
plained only through knowledge of the overall ordering of his beliefs. For 
example, an individual may state that if he could find a job in another area 
he would migrate to  take the job, but when a job is offered to him in an- 
other location, he is unwilling to go. When seen in the context of his belief 
system, such a contradiction might be explained by the presence of an over- 
arching belief in staying near his family, in their home. He may think that 
he wants and would take a job anywhere, but until he has an opportunity to 
act on that choice, he may not be aware of the intensity of his over-arching 
belief, which supersedes his need for a better job. 
Statements can be tested for their "beliefness" by determining whether or 
not someone is willing to  act in accordance with what he says. "Willing- 
ness-to-act-on" is similar to the "testable-in-principle" criterion for an em- 
pirical statement discussed by Hempel in Aspects of Scientific Explanation 
(Loflin, 1975:4). That is, one of the criteria used to determine whether a 
statement could be empirical is to see if the statement is, at least in principle, 
one that could be tested. In the same way, a criterion used to determine 
whether a statement could be a belief is to  see if it could be acted upon, at 
least in principle. 
Central to  our analytical schema is the notion that there are "pan- 
human" logical processes. Saying that logical processes are pan-human 
means that no society possesses a unique logic; all societies possess a set of 
logical processes that are universally shared. The logical processes by which 
conclusions are reached are assumed to be the same for all people. The data 
used in the logical processes will vary, as will their selective uses for particu- 
lar purposes, but we assume that the way in which conclusions are derived 
does not vary. Positing the existence of universal logical processes allows us 
to reconstruct beliefs from natural language interactions. Natural language 
is the language people use in everyday conversation; it is the spontaneous, 
non-elicited expression of an individual's beliefs and thoughts. "Recon- 
structed symbol strings represent meanings postulated by the investigator as 
implicit in the communicative interaction being studied and warranted by 
some evidential base such as the immediate socio-physical context, the 
grammar, the extended cultural context, or any combination of these" 
(Loflin, 1975:2). Any non-elicited linguistic exchange will serve as a data 
base for reconstruction, Because the data must be of a non-elicited type, the 
natural language interaction chosen for recording and analysis should be 
one in which the subject of interest to  the investigator is being discussed. 
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This selection process is crucial to limiting the amount of data recorded t o  
that which will be useful for anlaysis. 
The need, inherent in this approach, for accuracy and specificity of data 
for reconstructing beliefs requires that the linguistic exchanges used as data 
be tape-recorded. A further constraint on the approach is the length of time 
required for an individual researcher to gather sufficient data on an inform- 
ant. Because the reconstructions are based on non-elicited information, 
such an interaction may consume many hours before enough information to 
allow analysis is gathered. Reconstruction is, essentially, the procedure of 
making explicit and mutually consistent those elements that are only im- 
plied in each speaker's portion of the linguistic interaction. 
Reconstructing beliefs and ordering them into hierarchies necessitates a 
natural language data base. Natural language interactions, as opposed to 
elicited language interactions, provide an empirical base that is an inde- 
pendent framework for taxonomy and belief reconstruction because the 
framework is that of the speaker, not of the observer. By using the in- 
formant's framework, we limit the observer's ability to superimpose his 
or her analytical structure over the informant's. This is significant for 
comparative purposes, as it allows a more accurate representation than is 
allowed by a situation in which the observer's schema dominates that of 
the informant. If we assume that there are pan-human logical processes, 
and that one rule of such processes is a principle of non-contradiction, 
then we can further assume that when an individual presents apparently 
contradictory statements one of the following conditions exists: (1) there 
is a linguistic misunderstanding; (2) the individual is purposely misleading 
us; or (3) there are other beliefs, not immediately known to us, that al- 
low the contradictory statements to share the same cognitive framework. 
A simple example might be an individual who states that he does not 
believe in drinking alcoholic beverages, but that he does drink them. The 
apparent contradiction can be explained by knowing that the individual 
also believes that social acceptance requires that he drink, and that he 
desires social acceptance. With this new knowledge, the conclusion that 
he drinks makes sense. What I am suggesting is the formalization of a 
process that all people engage in, particularly anthropoIogists in the field. 
That process is gathering contextual information (it may also be drink- 
ing). By gathering the contextual linguistic information and formally re- 
constructing it into beliefs and hierarchical belief systems, we may be 
able to make general observations about the configurations of belief sys- 
tems held by migrants and those held by non-migrants. 
This is not a new idea. Cognitive anthropologists in particular, and 
ethnographers in general, have tried to understand how different people 
perceive the world around them, including the informant's perception of 
options in that world. Using natural language interactions to provide the 
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context, or framework, to explicate people's behavior will not explain 
why migration occurs. It may, however, demonstrate why people with a 
certain belief system will migrate, while others in similar circumstances 
but with a different belief system will not. It may even prove possible to 
distinguish a set of cognitive factors that condition the beliefs shared by 
all migrants, and only migrants, regardless of their points of origin. 
The first step in isolating an individual's belief set is the use of the in- 
dividual's own words as a data base for the construction of term taxon- 
omies. If beliefs are shaped and expanded through verbal interactions, 
then it is requisite that we investigate that form of interaction. It may be 
that any new knowledge is categorized as to its degree of similarity or 
dissimilarity to information already heId by an individual. That is, when 
an individual is presented with new information, it may be incorporated 
into his or her present knowledge by way of analogy. If this is the case 
(and it is yet to be proven), then by understanding how people organize 
and categorize information, we will gain important data concerning their 
perception of their worlds and their beliefs about those worlds. By treat- 
ing a taxonomy of terms used by that individual in the course of every- 
day conversational speech, we make explicit the relationships between 
terms arid the underlying conceptual organization used. These features 
can then be compared with those of other individuals. 
It is assumed that individuals organize terms into taxonomies (not, 
however, always explicitly) and that those taxonomies may be schematic- 
ally represented in a tree-diagram. As has already been suggested, people 
may incorporate new information into belief sets by comparison of the 
similarities and differences between the new information and the infor- 
mation they already have. This comparison is based on principles of cat- 
egory inclusion-exclusion. Constructing taxonomies of an individual's 
terms and/or beliefs is useful in two ways. First, the exercise of con- 
structing the taxonomy acts as a heuristic for the analyst by forcing the 
explication of relationships that frequently are only implicit in an indi- 
vidual's speech. Second, the taxonomy functions as a device for validat- 
ing the rules reconstructed by the analyst. 
If we can discover the rules individuals use for ordering their beliefs, 
then we will understand the processes by which their beliefs are hierarch- 
ically arranged, as well as how the structure is maintained and changed. 
In trying to understand what cognitive factors are operating for mi- 
grants, we need to know whether the migrants have beliefs that are dis- 
tinct from those held by non-migrants (we know of at least one belief 
difference: the migrants have already migrated), It is equally important 
to know whether there are types of hierarchical arrangements of beliefs 
that are shared among migrants, but that are not found among non- 
migrants. It is unlikely that a clear dichotomy between beliefs of migrants 
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and non-migrants would exist apart from the environmental influences 
shared by migrants that are not found among non-migrants. We may find, 
however, that certain arrangements of belief sets cross-cut the migrant/ 
non-migrant division, suggesting that the migrant/non-migrant division 
may not yet be fully comprehended, and even that such a division may be 
fallacious. 
If we want to understand how people reach the conclusion to migrate, 
we must know how they manipulate symbols in their decision-making. 
Terms and sentences are the symbols used most frequently in linguistic 
analysis. A serious problem encountered by those using terms and sen- 
tences as units of analysis is the relative isolation of the linguistic data 
from any significant context. That is, most linguistic information is con- 
veyed through the combination of terms and sentences. When either unit 
is studied apart from its larger context, the resulting amount of knowl- 
edge gained is drastically reduced. In an attempt to find a naturally oc- 
curring unit of language symbols that could encompass a context greater 
than a single sentence, we have defined a unit referred to as 
discursernent. A discursement is a unit of natural language containing 
agreement of meaning-features and at least one inference. It must have 
two or more sentences that share some meaning-features and also an in- 
ference and a conclusion. A frequently used example of discursement is a 
syllogism such as the following: 
(1) all migrants are transients 
(2) this person is a migrant 
(3) th.erefore, this person is a transient; 
or (1) all X's are Y's 
(2) this is an X 
(3) therefore, this is a Y 
The above examples show meaning-feature agreement between migrant 
and transient and X and Y. In both examples, the inference occurs be- 
tween (1) and (2), and the conclusion is (3). 
By using discursements as the units of analysis, I hope to incorporate a 
level of context previously unavailable for linguistic analysis. The ex- 
tended linguistic context can disambiguate' sentences that are ambiguous 
in isolation, provide new information, and, most importantly, present 
clues to the cognitive principles that people use in organizing and concep- 
tualizing their realities. 
The study of migrants should incorporate an investigation not only of 
how they perceive their worlds, but of the factors they consider in their 
decision-making. We can analyze decision-making by reconstructing in- 
formants'inference chains, making the chains explicit and replicable. A 
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"processual" approach to the analysis of both decision-making and the 
incorporation of new knowledge is to look at how taxonomies are altered. 
When an individual incorporates new information into an existing frame- 
work, the result is a change in the structure of his or her taxonomy. Dis- 
cursements provide a formal means of making these processes of change ex- 
plicit. Since any realignment of terms and beliefs, or addition of new in- 
formation, will necessarily involve an intersection of inferences and mean- 
ing features, discursements can be used as a unit of analysis. Discursements, 
because they provide an expanded linguistic context, demonstrate how an 
individual manipulates symbols during belief change. Our concern with 
processes dictates the necessity of avoiding static constructions. By 
reconstructing taxonomies based on discursements, we can conceptualize 
both the underlying beliefs and the perceptual changes experienced by the 
informant. 
I suggest that because theories dealing with factors external to the in- 
dividual have not been sufficient to explain who will migrate, we would 
benefit by combining that type of external information with our knowl- 
edge of an individual's configuration of beliefs. I propose that when a n  
individual's behavior is seen within the context of his belief system, we 
will be better able to disambiguate why some people become migrants 
and others do not. Both linguistic context and the context of belief sys- 
tem hold keys to understanding what criteria individuals consider rele- 
vant in decision-making. These contexts are crucial to the interpretation 
of any spontaneous human linguistic exchange, yet are absent from di- 
rected interviews, life histories, and other forms of elicitation. The full 
linguistic context allows for disambiguation of referents, embedding, and 
apparent contradictions in the speaker's performance. This clarification 
is necessary for understanding what speakers consider to be the criteria 
upon which they base their beliefs and, thus, upon which they act. 
By using discursements as our unit of analysis, we can gather extensive 
data about beliefs and investigate the process involved in acquiring and 
changing beliefs. The ability to construct and change beliefs is crucial to 
all people. Migrants, by changing their locale, must at the very least be 
able to manipulate their beliefs to  fit their new situations. We hope, by 
investigating their beliefs, (including acquisition and change), to  understand 
better what makes an individual become a migrant, and the cognitive conse- 
quences of such a decision. Perhaps by this procedure we can put the 
migrant back into the study of migration. 
NOTE 
1. It is recognized that "disambiguate" is an awkward neologism, but because there IS no 
other word that conveys the same meaning, I will continue to follow Dr. Marvin Loflin's 
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usage. D~sarnbrguaf~on is the ability to make explicit one meaning In a s i tuat~on which poten- 
tially has multiplemeanings. 
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